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This paper aims to clarify the notion of formal and non-formal security provisioning in 
Nigeria by locating hybridity in the seeming divisions amongst security providers. It 
interrogates the interwoven processes that occur at the core of formal and informal 
security actors, juxtaposed against extensive interfaces of wide range of diverse state 
and non-state security actors. Using extant literature and multi-layer approach to 
gather and analyse data, it explores Embeddedness, Role/Character, Impact, 
Legitimacy vs Legality at all level of security governance in Nigeria. It argues that the 
distinction between formal and non-formal security institutions is often hasty and 
misleading specifically in the context of Nigeria. Observing that, the existence of the 
informal security (pluralistic security order) has been part of everyday life in security 
landscape of communities across Nigeria due to the emasculation of Westphalian 
postulations by normative African setting. More so, questions the single monolithic 
Westphalian security provisioning construct viz-a-viz a more traditionally attuned 
pluralistic security provisioning settings often entrenched in a post conflict or emerging 
society.  
In the contest of security, the formal actors are identified with primacy but due to the 
numerical inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the formal security actors; the in-
formalisation of the state machinery begins to proliferate. Similarly, the paper observes 
the trajectory and proliferation of informal security actors in security provisioning 
structured based on jurisdiction and typologies. The paper highlights that women face 
governance challenges in security sector ranging from the need to rebalance security 
and liberty. The paper argues that despite all the frameworks, agenda setting, national 
action plans advocacy and training, only made substantive progress on women’s 
participation in security structures and processes such that women are under-
representation and negatively portrayed in the security (sector) institutions thus 
stagnating their social progress and among other things makes recommendation for 
policymakers and practitioners. The paper also provides perspective and argues the 












Globally, the maintenance of State security and protection of citizens are key 
responsibilities of governments. This is essential because security is vital for citizens to 
realize their full potential to contribute to national prosperity and development. It is for 
these reasons that countries establish security agencies to protect their territories and 
populations against external or internal threats.1 In Nigeria, these responsibilities are 
expected to be performed by state’s security actors, which have the core responsibility 
of designing and implementing the country’s security policies for the protection of the 
State and its citizens. With the complexity and upsurge of violent conflicts and 
criminality in the country, one may wonder if State security actors can effectively 
respond to most of the challenges at hand.  
These violent conflicts and criminalities have created security and safety gaps that 
individuals and communities struggle to fill in manners they considered as most 
appropriate. One of the consequences of poor security provisioning, is that most 
members of the society now resort to self-help by inclining towards cultural cleavages 
and or by using private, non-state sector approaches/actors to address their security 
needs. The study argues that, such complementary roles would rather enhance security 
provisioning in Nigeria against the hitherto exclusionary state posture. 
Studies2 conducted in Nigeria in the past established the pivotal roles that non-state 
(informal) policing systems play in addressing the safety and security needs of majority 
of the deprived population. In particular, informal policing systems are patronized by 
                                                          
1 Carnesale  Albert and  Micheal Nacht,  Forward International Security 1 (1)2 (1976).   
2 See Alemika, Etannibi E.O and Chukwuma, Innocent C. (2003) Analysis of Police 
and Policing in Nigeria: A Desk study of the role of policing as Barrier to change or 
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Alemika, E, Igbo, E.U & Nnorom, C. P: (2006) Crime Victimization, Safety and 
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the poor for a variety of reasons including knowledge of the inner recess of the society, 
its grassroots outlook, the protection of their neighbourhoods from criminal attacks, 
provision of speedy safety and security services, which the formal state security outfits 
are alienated from.  However, their existence and operations have not only added to the 
plurality of actors but also compounded the ambiguity of roles and relationships.  
In recent times there has been a paradigm shift, in the trends and patterns of security 
from households up to the State level. In most households, families hire guards for the 
protection of their homes. At community levels, neighbourhood watches and vigilantes 
have been created for broader community protection schemes, leading to the emergence 
of loosely organized non-state security actors. At the State level, these non-state actors 
now exist and operate alongside the police, army and all other public policing or 
regulatory agencies. These non-State actors are often well-organized and undertake 
crime prevention through patrols, investigation and at times, through violent means.3 
Consequently, with the current mix, there are inevitable areas of inter-relatedness 
between the State and the non-State security actors, which creates a hybrid concept of 
security provisioning. 
The Federal Government’s monopoly of the institutions of security worked fairly well 
during the military era, where other tiers of government were subordinates to the central 
tier.  Conversely, on the return to civil rule in 1999, the structural autonomy of the 
federating states conflicted with the centralization of security infrastructures, fuelling 
the demand for State or Regional police in some quarters. In the absence of State police, 
the operation of other non-State actors such as vigilantes has complemented, but often 
                                                          
3 Peter Albrecht, The Need For A Systemic Approach To Urban Security: Danish 
Institute for International Studies 2015. 
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times interfered with the mandate of State security forces. Consequently, the urban 
space in Nigeria presents an environment that tends to reinforce the call for the 
implementation of the concept of the hybridization of the security system. This would 
be a combination and use of multifaceted (State and non-State) actors, towards safety 
and security at community levels.4 
From the foregoing, this paper aims to firstly, identity and analyse the diverse 
complexities of the formal and informal security sectors, secondly, examine the 
similarities and differences between formal and informal security provisioning, thirdly, 
review the management and accountability processes, fourthly, deliberate on the 
perceived impact of the hybridization of the formal and informal system on vulnerable 
citizens and communities, and lastly, assess the gender roles in formal and informal 
security structures while promoting a hybrid security system in Nigeria utilizing 
questions on the patterns of embedding between the State and hybrid security 
organizations, the likely impacts of the processes of hybridization on the current 
security order and their impacts on vulnerable groups such as the gender considerations 
in the processes of hybridization. 
Hybrid Security Actors under Examination 
There is the general perception that the ineffective policing and rising crime had given 
impetus to the emergence of a plethora of non-state policing groups in Nigeria5 but 
arguably to note, these groups have existed prior to the advent of colonialism. 
                                                          
4 Chris M. A. Kwaja, Informal security Provisioning in Nigeria: Implication for security 
Sector Governance (© 2014 Centre for Security Governance) accessed April 10, 2016  
 http://www.security governance'/Informal Security Provisioning in Nigeria 
Implications  for Security Sector Governance  Security Sector Reform Resource 
Centre.htm 
5 Baker B., “Multi choice policing in Uganda”, Policing and Society, 15(1) 2005 
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Consequently, the Nigerian state has shared its security responsibility with a variety of 
non-political organisations including vigilante groups, religious vigilante, ethnic 
militias and private security guards. The activities of these multiply actors of plural 
policing manifests in different forms, guises and are characterised by cooperation, co-
option, and in some cases conflict.6   In the context of this paper, non-state in security 
actor emerged as vigilantes to fill gaps, as opposition to state or parallel forces, then get 
incorporated or codified in laws, or proscribed. Importantly, they are adaptive in nature 
and some like the Civilian JTF are likely to evolve as the situation which they evolved 
to respond to changes. 
a) The Bakassi Boys 
In the South-East of Nigeria, the Bakassi Boys is a group established in Aba Abia state 
with an objective to patrol the markets, prevent crime as well as investigate acts of 
crime within the precinct of the commercial hub of the city.  The success of the group 
arises from its vicious activities, propelled by rumours and fears leading to drastic 
reduction in crime. This successes further spread their activities from markets spaces to 
communities and beyond to neighbouring Anambra and Imo States.  The Bakassi Boys 
were armed with lethal weapons without police authorization and often make routine 
spectacles of captured suspects, paraded naked and often treated cruelly, inhumanely 
and at most times killed.  
Though the group succeeded in controlling crime in the region, they did not succeed in 
creating an atmosphere of safety as residents live more in fear of the Bakassi Boys than 
in fear of regular crime and to poses alleged supernatural powers. Complaints about the 
                                                          
6 Jimam Timchang Lar, Vigilantism, State, and Society in Plateau State,  Nigeria: 
 A History of Plural Policing   (1950 to the present) A Thesis Submitted in Partial 
Fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  (Dr Phil) in 
African History awarded by BIGSAS at Bayreuth University November 2015 
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high-handedness of the Bakassi Boys again pitched them against the Nigeria Police. 
The Federal Government proscribed the operation of the Bakassi Boys and totally 
disbanded the non-state (informal) security provider but overtime, the aforementioned 
states created laws backing the operations of the group. The field study of the Bakassi 
Boys was collected in Abia State, where the group was founded. 
b) The Civilian JTF (Borno state) 
The Civilian Joint Task Force locally known as “yan gora” (‘men with sticks’)7 is a 
community based non-state offshoot of the Joint Task Force set up by the Nigerian 
Military in concert with community members. It has over time earned relevant state 
government supports to confront the Boko Haram insurgency. Before its co-option by 
various tiers of government, it had emerged as a vigilante group depicting the civilian 
population’s response to the menace of insecurity in the Northern Eastern states of 
Nigeria. The group operates semi-autonomously from state control since June 2013, 
within Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States and unlike the Military’s JTF, the Civilian 
JTF’s troops speak local languages (Kanuri, Shuwa, Hausa and Arabic); understand 
local cultures, share religion or geography and comprised of youths between the ages 
of 15 to 35 mainly from the affected areas with grassroots structures in local 
government areas.  
The Civilian JTF was set up as vigilante groups and loosely organized into area 
coverage called ‘sectors’ (neighbourhoods) in the communities under the supervision 
of the Joint Task Force state commands. They are equipped with axes, knives, bows 
and arrows, locally made guns and any other traditional means of weaponry. 
                                                          
7 Daniel Agbiboa, Resistance to Boko Haram: Civilian Joint Task Forces in North-
Eastern Nigeria, Conflict Studies Quarterly Special Issues, 2015 
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Accordingly, their weaponry is inferior to the sophisticated ones used by the insurgents 
or the military. In spite of the obvious disadvantage in firepower, the Civilian JTF is 
reputable with remarkable success fighting off major assaults and making arrests.  
Following its recorded successes, the Military Joint Task Force initiated working 
relationship with the community based CJTF.   
c) Hisbah (Kano) 
The introduction of Islamic Penal Law (Sharia) in the early 2000s, shortly after the 
return to democratic civilian led government; in the northern part of Nigeria, steered 
the formation of a faith based policing group known as Hisbah to enforce Sharia laws. 
These laws among other things include ban on alcohol consumption, indecent dressing, 
arrest of petty thieves and executing punishments for all offences ordered by a sharia 
court. The Hisbah, a faith based security policing group is considered non-state because 
it emerged from the need to enforce religious laws and separated from the mainstream 
policing system that is constitutionally defined in the country yet formal as it was 
created by a confederating state government with an enabling law and performs the 
function of ensuring compliance to the Sharia law which is a state-owned (formal) law. 
On 9th of February 2006 The operations of the Hisbah group attracted the concern of 
the federal state police who sought legal interpretation against Hisbah and the Kano 
State government on the basis that the new policing outfit was not only 
unconstitutionally but as well usurping its exclusive policing powers as enshrined in 
section 214 to 216 of the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria.8 The 
contestation of the legality of the state-owned Hisbah led to a long litigation wherein 
                                                          
8 See Rasheed Olaniyi, Sharia, vigilantes and the State in metropolitan Kano, Nigeria: 
the battle for social control 
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the police sought to proscribe the functioning of the Hisbah without accepting to 
enforce the Sharia law. In between the litigation, a mild drama over the use and control 
of the Nigeria Police played out, and further reinforced the import of the Nigeria Police 
to the Federal Government and its detachment at the state command from the public 
and their interests at the grassroots.9 
Though Hisbah group was established to complement the police in their statutory duties 
and not rivals it, the Hisbah criminal code system contrasts sharply with the 
conventional legal system posing a paradox. For the Proponents of the Sharia law, the 
inauguration of Hisbah denotes democracy at work that would drive social 
transformation, economic ethics, and reduce crime.  In its earlier phase, Hisbah was 
linked to partisan party politics; accusations stated it was primarily used by the governor 
as a political machine rather than for the enforcement of Sharia law. Hisbah is queried 
on intricacies of security and redefines crime and criminality in Kano. For instance, 
Hisbah engendered skirmishes and breaches of social order, especially Sections 1 (3) 
and 4 (5) of the Nigerian constitution which protect the fundamental rights of citizens.10 
Severally, the NPF and Hisbah clash over the enforcement of the Shari’a law in Kano 
state. The tension was accentuated by the gradual shift in the policing power base which 
threatened the police authority and status quo in dealing with public order. The Kano 
police force cautioned the Hisbah Committee not to over-step its mandate in the 
implementation of the Shari’a legal code. The most recent of such cases was the 2015 
emergence of a new Emir for the ancient Kano kingdom considered politically a 
stronghold of the then opposition party and from the believe that the new Emir has 
                                                          
9 See Rasheed Olaniyi, Sharia, vigilantes and the State in metropolitan Kano, Nigeria: 
the battle for social control 
10 Rasheed Olaniyi, Sharia, vigilantes and the State in metropolitan Kano, Nigeria: the 
battle for social control 
10 
 
sympathy for the then opposition party the federal government ordered the removal of 
its police protection from the palace of the Emir, the offices and residence of the then 
Kano State Governor. In response to the withdrawal of the federal police, the state 
Governor drafted in the newly and contestable state’s Hisbah group to the services of 
protecting the new Emir and himself. The study of Hisbah as a non-state security outfit 
was conducted in Kano state, North West Nigeria. 
d) The O’odua People’s Congress – OPC 
In the South-West, the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) emerged largely as response 
to the fiercest military dictatorship of Nigeria’s post-colonial history. OPC grew out of 
the controversy which trailed the annulment of the presidential election of 1993 
perceived to have been won by M.K.O. Abiola. The OPC’s official fundamental 
objectives are set out in its constitution. The OPC claims to have several million 
members, men and women in smaller proportion, Christian, Muslims and Traditionalist 
with a bulk concentrated in the heart of Yorubaland.  
The OPC was labelled a mass movement; its movement was not as high as at its 
inception in 1994 created specific circumstance characterised by frustrated promises of 
democratic transition and fierce repression of political opposition.11 The founders of 
OPC adopted ethnic reading of the political situation and resort to use of force to reach 
its goals. Yvan observe these two elements laid the ground for the conversion of the 
OPC into ethnic rebellion.12  Ibeanu and Momoh also agreed that it was due to the 
                                                          
11 Yvan Guichaoua, The Making of an Ethnic Militia: The Oodua People’s Congress in 
Nigeria. Crises Working Paper No 26 November 2006 
12 Yvan Guichaoua, The Making of an Ethnic Militia 
11 
 
“increasing youth restiveness, economic hardship, social tension and insecurity that the 
OPC formed a vigilante wing to handle the matter of neighbourhood security”.13 
By 1996, the OPC had become violent organisation more feared than the criminals it 
was designed to confront. They challenged the Police, Army and Federal Government 
over the annulment of the 1993 election; they were thought to be untouchable even by 
the federal government. Members of the OPC frequently went about with charms and 
amulets. It’s reliance on magical techniques and beliefs gave advantage to their activity 
and rumoured to possess supernatural powers not only to withstand bullets but also to 
magically know suspects and solve tough crimes. This magical equipment is often 
complemented by more classical weaponry, such as carry guns, locally produced, stolen 
or smuggled from police stores.14 The Odua’a People’s Congress is one of the largest 
ethnic militia’s in Nigeria today Primary data on the successor of OPC was collected in 
Lagos State. 
Literature Review 
Two main trends generally dominate discourses in Nigeria about security mechanisms 
and security providers. The culturalist trend that highlights the extraordinary role of 
militias as security providers and the normative trend that emphasizes the persistent and 
stereotyped portrayal of the Nigerian state as inherently weak. The concept of 
hybridization or pluralism in security provisioning has engaged the minds of 
government officials, media practitioners, scholars, and security officials in 
dissertations on security arrangements. Scholars have focused on both the actors that 
operate within the rule of law and those often considered as being illiberal by Western 
                                                          
13 Okechukwu Ibeanu and Abubakar Momoh 2008  
14 Yvan Guichaoua, The Making of an Ethnic Militia 
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paradigms, such as warlords, cartels, paramilitaries, millenarian cults, anti-
globalisation movements and mafias.15 In spite of these literature, this paper identifies 
compelling reasons why the distinctions between formal and non-formal security 
institutions are misleading in general, but more specifically in the context of Nigeria.16  
The paper argues that non-state security institutions are not necessarily un-official in 
character as they are often quite official in organization and activities. Similarly, some 
public security arrangements are not official, particularly counter-insurgency forces, 
some of which operate underground using unofficial and unorthodox methods. Hence, 
to define non-state security arrangements as unofficial suggests that they are ad-hoc and 
casual in character, making it cumbersome to distinguish between legal or illegal, as 
many non-State security arrangements are recognized by law and regulated by statute.  
Scholars have written extensively on the existence and emergence of informal policing, 
in which all members of a community were responsible for maintaining order. In other 
words, private individuals, groups, associations and organizations carried out policing 
from the beginning of human history.  To Bangoura, organization of security along 
occupational, community or religious lines or even witchcraft practices, working or 
exchange groups, networks.17 It is estimated that non-state providers in Africa deliver 
play critical roles in providing security and justice services.18 
                                                          
15 Reno, W. Warlord Politics and African States Boulder Colorado: Lynne Reihner 
Publishers 1999 
16 Okechukwu Ibeanu and Abubakar Momoh 2008 State Responsiveness to Public 
Security Needs: The Politics of Security Decision making. Nigeria Country Study, 
(London: Conflict and Development Group, Kings College). 
17 Bangoura affirms studies on security in Africa to have pointed out the organization 
of security along occupational, community or religious lines or even witchcraft 
practices, working or exchange groups, networks 
18 OECD DAC, Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and 
Justice, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2007; Bruce Baker, 
Security in Post 
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Ekeh, also noted that from time immemorial, ordinary men and women have made 
several sacrifices to ensure the safety of both their lives and those of their families.19 
Lar asserts that, plurality is not merely a function of current practice but traceable to a 
specific historical moment, from the last decade of British colonialism.20  Dambazau 
also admitted that the primary purpose of policing during this period was to promote 
the economic and political interest of the colonial masters and also engage in the brutal 
subjugation of communities and the suppression of resistance to colonial rule.21   
Igbo identifies Age grades, masquerades, extended family, secret cults and other local 
organizations including vigilante groups were used in policing various communities in 
Nigeria” before the advent of formal policing, after the stages of transformation in the 
1930’s.22 Ibeanu and Momoh also claims, neighbourhood watches and vigilantes have 
spread as a result of persistent low police capacity adequately to keep the populace safe 
since colonial times. Gore and Pratten opines vigilante groups or self-help organizations 
evolved after the civil war of the 1970’s, due drastic increase in crimes of violence and 
robberies and the proliferation of small arms increased23 while Shearing had observed 
the low institutional capacity to deliver public and physical security for the citizens 
efficiently and effectively created a security vacuum, increasingly filled by private 
actors in response to genuine demands for citizens’ protection24,  Omeje identified the 
                                                          
19 Ekeh PP, A Review of HRW’Ss and CLEEN’s Report: The Bakkassi Boys: The 
Legitimation of Murder and Torture on State Sponsored Vigilante Groups in Nigeria. 
20 Jimam Timchang Lar, Vigilantism, State, and Society in Plateau State,  Nigeria 
21 Nigeria: rest in pieces, 2005. Dambazua 2007; 229-230; Ibeanu and Momoh; Olaniyi 
22 Igbo, 1999, 2007; Ibeanu and Momoh 2008; Aleimika; Tamuno, T.N. (1993), “Crime 
and Security in Pre-colonial Nigeria: in Policing Nigeria: Past, Present and Future: 
Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited 
23 Oruwan 2006; Gore and Pratten, David, ‘Introduction. The politics of protection: 
perspectives on vigilantism in Nigeria’, 2008a 
24 Shearing, C, Policing: Relationships Between its Public and Private forms, 1993, pp 




proliferation of incidents of State failure as the re-invention and comeback of 
traditionalism in all sectors of the society, and consequently a mystical re-
traditionalisation of security.25    
Conversely, as societies became more complex, however, these informal methods 
become effective due to increased heterogeneous populations and lack of social 
solidarity. The representations of vigilantes in Nigeria connect in many ways to 
historical discourses about vigilantism, drawing numerous dichotomies.26 Omeje 
suggests that security was systematically detached from society, and its interrelated 
social structures vested in the modern bureaucratic State, and consequently the 
phenomenon became overly professionalized, secularized and militarized.27 This 
trajectory of security dynamics is categorized by Yoroms as contexts of insecurity 
driven by colonialism, the politics of divide and rule, economic flight and the existence 
of colonial states, which were highly linked to their home governments. Thus, the 
transfer of power to the local petit-bourgeoisie in the sub-region only served to 
exacerbate their quest to monopolize power.28  
Accordingly, Klocker and Oghi, vigilantism or self-help organization is identified as 
one category of informal policing29, which continued to exist in secret despite attempts 
to counter them both in the colonial State and independent Nigeria. Ibeanu and Momoh 
                                                          
25 Kenneth Omeje, Oil Conflict in Nigeria: Contending Issues and Perspectives of the 
Local Niger Delta People, 2005 New Political Economy 10/3 
26 See Marianne Vardodalos , Engaging Terror: A critical and Interdisciplinary 
Approach University publishers.com amazon.com  
27 Kenneth Omeje, Oil Conflict in Nigeria: Contending Issues and Perspectives of the 
Local Niger Delta People, 2005 New Political Economy 10/3 
28 Yoroms, G., Survey of Regional Security and Security Sector Reform in West Africa; 
in Sanda, J. (ed). 2004: Democratic Governance and Regional Security in West Africa; 
FES Publication. 
29  Klockers G.B The idea of Police Beverly Hills Calf: 1985; Oghi 2013. 
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advanced the development of private security arrangements in Nigeria, classifying them 
into the moment of resort to traditional self-help strategies to compensate inadequacies; 
the moment of mapping of non-state security structures in the growth of private security 
companies; and the moment of the trajectory of private security arrangements, which 
saw the emergence of armed militias, arising out of gaps in public security decision-
making structures in the face of increasing crime.30 Similarly, Alemika and Chukwuma 
recognize four typologies of vigilantism as religious vigilantism, ethnic vigilantism, 
state-sponsored vigilantism and neighbourhood or community ‘vigilantism.31 
Further, Ibeanu and Momoh, Oghi, Aleimika and Chukwuma; Fourchard, 200532 
agreed that the intensified economic and political crisis of the 1980’s and the 
unprecedented degree of identity politics, ethnic, religious or regional identity to 
struggle for access to state and resource control or demand for basic rights and socio-
economic provisioning as well as protest against exclusion and oppression have led to 
the present security challenge in the country.33 Smith further buttressed that, 
“vigilantism’ popularity is response to a widely shared sense of political and economic 
reforms that has led to greater inequality and injustice and a failure of accountability” 
arguing that in spite of the reported atrocities of the group, the eager public was 
                                                          
30 See Ibeanu and Momoh 2008. 
31 See Alemika and Chukwuma. 
32 Ibeanu and Momoh 2008; Oghi 2013; Aleimika and Chukwuma 2007, Fourchard, 
2005. 
33 Jega, A. “The State and Identity Transformation Under Structural Adjustment in 
Nigeria” in A. Jega ed. Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural 
Adjustment in Nigeria, 2000 Uppsala & Kano: Nordic African Institute and Centre for 
Research and Documentation: 11-23. 
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unwavering in its support for the insurgents as they continued to turn out en-masse to 
witness executions of alleged criminals by the group.34 
Additionally, Caparini notes political inefficiency of the corrupt State police warranted 
the existence of informal ordering. The common development in the transitional 
countries is commonly known as “shadows” an informal non-state based organization 
of varying legitimacy. Shadows take many forms, but mostly and commonly as a 
community based informal justice or vigilante type, processes or private security 
organization.35 Equally, Caparini and Kwaja argued that “the Informal security 
structures have become a part of the everyday security landscape of most communities 
across Nigeria, due to the cluelessness of the formal security actors to the security 
challenges in the country”, but this is not to say, formal security, policing and justice 
institutions are cases subverted, corrupted or incapable of performing their security 
functions. It is also important to note that emergent non-State groups benefit from their 
proximity with local communities, understanding of local norms and practices, as well 
as, mutual trust between them and local community leaders in providing tailored made 
security measures in local capacity.36  
Kwaja proposes that the emergence and activity of informal security can complement 
or even dislodge the State in the provision of security for their communities, due to the 
failure to gain or even seek the legitimacy, confidence, and respect of the people they 
                                                          
34 Daniel Jordan Smith, Violent Vigilantism and the State in Nigeria, The Case of  the 
Bakassi Boys 
35 Caparini Marina and Ortwin Marenin, Transforming the Police in Central and Eastern 
Europe (2002) 
36 See Lessons Learned and upcoming Research Issues in Democratic Controls of 
Armed forces Security Sector Reform; In Born H et al: Security Sector Reform and 
Democracy in Transitional Societies. Baden Baden 2002 
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are supposed to protect.37 Andrea identifies vigilante groups to possess both 
disintegrative and reintegrated dimension. Vigilante activities he notes are not 
necessarily a sigh of loss of State control over violence as conventional failed States; 
instead, vigilantes are interwoven with the State through complex relationships of 
cooperation and competition. Hence, they simultaneously strengthen and weaken 
different dimensions of Statehood.38 Accordingly, this study argues that hybridity in 
security can be a conduct for building cooperation and political trust. North emphasized 
the interaction between the rules (institutions) and players (organizations), detailing the 
importance of informal rules and how they are complementary to formal rules.39  
Gender inequalities are pervasive on all levels of society and are reinforced by the state 
and non-state apparatus. Within this context, the actions of formal and informal security 
actors inevitably affect gender dynamics. Often times, gender in a wider hybrid security 
sector is treated as a niche issue, and in some cases peripheral, rather than seen as an 
integral part of the broader security sector agenda. To buttress the place of gender in a 
responsive government context, and in specific terms, Salahub pointed out that gender 
policy is more than a human rights issue. Security institutions, she noted tend to be 
designed and operated by men.40  
                                                          
37 Chris M. A. Kwaja, Informal security Provisioning in Nigeria: Implication for 
security Sector Governance (© 2014 Centre for Security Governance) accessed April 
10, 2016   http://www.security governance'/Informal Security Provisioning in 
Nigeria Implications  for Security Sector Governance Security Sector Reform 
Resource Centre.htm. 
38 See Andrea Kirschner, Putting Out Fire with Gasoline? Violence Control in “Fragile 
‘’ States: A Study of Vigilantism in Nigeria, January 2011, North Korea Journal  
39  Douglas C North Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
University Press 1990  
40 See Jennifer Erin Salahub, ed. (2011). African Women on the Thin Blue Line: 
Gender-Sensitive Police Reform in Liberia and Southern Sudan. Ottawa: The North-
South Institute. www.nsi .ins.ca/english/pdf/AfricanWomenontheThinBlueLine.pdf 
quoted in At the Margins of SSR: Gender and Informal Justice Conference Report (ed) 
Geoff Burt (2010) www.cigionline.org. 
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To meet the needs of women, their inclusion in security sector services, as well as, the 
development of policies sensitive to the different experiences of women, is necessary 
and must be responsive to the whole society, not just segments of it. The failure to 
provide security for citizens according to Alaga has resulted in the proliferation of non-
State security providers, whose activities are most often unregulated and unchecked by 
the State, thus doubly jeopardizing the security of citizens (men and women alike).41 
In most cases, the recourse to traditional security providers promotes discrimination 
and violence against particularly women and girls due to prevailing stereotyped cultural 
norms about the roles and relations between and among men and women.42  
Babatunde and Donli, also express the subordination of women in terms of power, 
status, employment and access to other resources in Nigeria, emphasizing the sexual 
composition and the social institutionalisation of male dominance and female 
subordination as the bedrock of traditional and cultural norms, values and practices that 
make women subordinate to men and therefore obstruct their progress within private 
and public spheres.43 The lack of societal consensus on fundamental issues, the 
unrepresentative and repressive governance approaches utilized by the State, coupled 
with the destabilizing impact of economic and social disparities have resulted in the 
systematic exclusion and marginalization of minority and vulnerable groups.  
A great deal of literature on informal security provisioning diagnosed the trends of 
security mechanisms, rule of law, existence, emergence, trajectory, typologies, 
economic factors, persistency of low institutional capacity due to it overly 
                                                          
41 Ecoma Alaga Gender and Security Policy in West Africa, working Paper Published 
online in May 2011 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Regional Office Abuja. 
42 Alaga, E, Security Sector Reform and Protection of Women in Africa, Seminar 
Report, United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa 2009 
43 See Babatunde Tosin 2015 and Patricia Donli 2008 
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professionalized, secularized and militarized nature only a few reasoned alongside the 
complementary, disintegrative and reintegrated dimension of informal security actors. 
The literature showed much progress made in closing the gender gap in areas of 
education, healthcare, employment and government, gender inequality is still pervasive 
in the face of highly complex lineage. The data on gender representation in for formal 
and non-formal security sector institutions are mostly inaccurate and largely 
inaccessible for which this paper intends to address. 
UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF HYBRIDIZATION, FORMALITY 
AND INFORMALITY 
There are diverse definitions and actors influencing the provision of security and 
justice. Hybridization in African context is also referred to as Twilight 
Institutions/Policing, Governance without government, Institutional multiplicity, and 
mediated state, Plural Policing or Institutional Pluralism (Plurality). In recognition of 
the diverse nature of security challenges in Nigeria and the need for a holistic approach 
to deal with these re-occurring challenges, this paper adopts the concept of 
hybridization as the process by which multiplicity of situations of diverse animating 
logics and forms of political authority coexist, collaborate, or compete to construct 
security arrangements.44 
In recent times, hybridization has gained significant currency among government 
officials, media practitioners, scholars, and security officials. It was introduced to 
capture the contested nature of governance and security arrangements in fragile and 
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post conflict States. Experts rightly note that hybrid contexts are negotiated, bargained 
and enforced through both formal and informal processes that coexist, overlap, and 
intertwine. As such, the hybrid natures of security rejects a purely state-centric 
approach to security and as a substitute, seeks to uncover complex arrays of 
international, state, and non-state actors, who all cooperate and compete for power and 
resources, as well as determine patterns of security and insecurity alike.   
The arrival of the liberal pluralist scholars conclude that states are not isolated actors in 
the political system and not necessarily homogenous because they composed of 
competing bureaucracies. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye re-examined the state 
centric paradigm because it has failed to identify the importance of non-state actors 
while Waltz emphasized the role of these actors arguing that the nature of power had 
changed and divided among different types of actors, its use had not.45 Security 
hybridity cannot be defined as neither a fragmentation of security apparatus actors 
mechanisms, nor as a division of labour between state and non-state actors rather it 
emphasizes on the processes in which diverse actors co-exist, negotiate, intertwine, 
compete and quite often complement each other and collaborate.46 Security actors have 
been discussed through rethinking the informal versus the formal. However, the 
security provision systems bring together state security forces, private and public 
provision or formal and informal actors.  
In many contexts, hybridization in security recognizes public services including 
security and justice as provided by actors and institutions beyond the State.47 Contrary 
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to the notion that formal systems are codified and process-driven while informal 
systems are lacking in systems and processes: hybrid practice connotes the core of 
formal institutions, their rules, processes and standards guide the non-formal. Such 
hybridity therefore allows a measure of overlap, interchange and indeed conflict 
between the formal and the non-formal.48 The distinction between the State and non-
State security actors is often arbitrary. By labelling one group (the State); by implication 
legitimate and the other (the non-State) by implication illegitimate, scholars, 
government policy makers and practitioners become embroiled in struggles of 
definition, acceptance and participation.  This paper believes the present discourse 
should be centred on assisting and enabling actors, structures respect human rights, 
provide effective legitimate security and justice services to communities, regardless of 
their form or relationship because both are not only interwoven in goals and objectives 
but also have distinct areas of influence.  
The paper presents four case studies, which have common classification as non-state 
actors, sharing the security space with state-owned security agencies in Nigeria. The 
four case studies presented have common classification as non-state actors, sharing the 
security space with state-owned security agencies. These non-state structures operate 
as vigilante or neighbourhood watch groups and from a cursory observation of the case 
studies, a typology of the vigilante evolution will be suggested, in which three distinct 
stages of progression will manifest, namely; the populist, consolidation and abuse phase 
and the demise.49  
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In an environment of uncertainty, insecurity and perceived inadequacy of existing 
security mechanisms unavoidably precede these stages of progression. This tripartite 
typology is well illustrated by the rise and fall of the Bakassi Boys in South East 
Nigeria. In the populist phase, there is widespread social acceptance of a self-help and 
non-State approach to the crises, the second phase, despite being perceived as the bigger 
evil in comparison to criminality by a section of the society, the Bakassi Boys spread 
beyond Aba to other towns of Abia and Anambra states where they received 
government endorsement, protection, drafted into the State machinery and renamed 
Abia State Vigilante Services. The state government then took responsibility for 
recruiting, training and remunerating the Bakassi Boys. The Abia State Vigilante 
Services became a government agency (parastatal) with officials recruited by 
government. Indeed informal institutions are seldom impartial, having their own 
political and economic agendas, some pursued through violence.50  
Hisbah and the Civilian Joint Task Force also received government endorsement and 
attendant support, making it safe to argue that this typology of hybrid security order has 
dual identity of community vigilante and State attempt to codify and sponsored 
community based vigilante. Conversely, OPC, Bakasi Boys and Hisbah have all 
survived – albeit – transformed into new structures, the CJTF  however, irrespective of 
it status of codification remain to be seen whether they would become institutionalised 
or transit into some either smaller or bigger roles owing to the vagaries of change in 
political dispensation.   
Similarly, some states have incorporated non-State systems into the official policing 
order by extending legality and legitimacy to it. For example, Lagos State passed the 
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Neighbourhood Safety Agency Bill 2016, which institutionalizes and codifies 
community security measures.  The Lagos state House of Assembly passed a Bill to 
establish the State Neighbourhood Agency and for the control of Vigilante Corps 
activities in the State after it passed its Third Reading at the plenary sitting. The Bill 
was initiated to strengthen the State security structure and activities in the State to assist 
in reducing criminal activities, incessant cases of kidnapping, ritual killings, gang war 
and domestic violence, among others.51 
Similarly, Laws on vigilantes have been passed in Kano and Abia States amongst 
others.  Distinctively, in Plateau State, the government created a hybrid institution 
called the ‘Operation Rainbow’, which constitutes of vigilante members, but has 
representation from all formal security services.  This is an example of a hybrid 
organization that is a non-state but state sponsored operating with official security 
actors.  At the National level, the National Assembly passed the Private Guards 
Companies Act directed at private security firms, provided there is a useful framework 
for conceptualizing cooperation between the formal and informal security 
organizations.52 
Patterns of “Embedding” Between Hybrid Security Organizations 
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The broad understanding of hybridization or hybridity lays valid claims as anti-thesis 
to the Westphalian stereotypes about state sovereignty and other forms of state 
monopoly of instruments of violence and state autonomy. It proposes that the provision 
of security should be empirically and operationally as a collection of loosely 
coordinated and constantly changing processes. However, its intellectual roots in 
subaltern history and anthropology, does not denote the mere grafting together of 
separate actors and institutions to make new entities.53 Such relationships can evidently 
be found amongst our case studies in their relationship and levels of intrinsic embedded-
ness amongst state security actors in Nigeria. Policing in the context of Nigeria as 
asserted by Lar changed vigilante practice because the interaction has created a certain 
kind of symbiotic interpenetration.54 
Hybridization occurs in different ways or through different levels and in different 
directions. Locally manifested aspects can be transferred to the national, regional or 
global level and may be adopted and institutionalized in a modern or mixed way. 
Importantly, the institution of policing in Nigeria has gone through different periods 
and experienced different processes of composition, structures and ultimately practice 
have not remained static55 Security decision-making in Nigeria has evolved principally 
around pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial states, as well as the political regimes. 
Lar affirms the link between the plural policing landscape of colonial Nigeria and the 
evolution of a new plurality of policing to emerge first decade after independence and 
has continued to evolve in response to changing political and social contexts.56 
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As observed by Ibeanu and Momoh between 1900 and 1994, security decision-making 
was top priority, although the issue of the provision of security in general was not an 
exclusive State affair.57 Participants noted during a FGD that:  
“…informal actors have existed in our community from time immemorial;  they have 
existed to checkmate security and livelihood of our community and  we have several 
groups supervising security, these include market association whose members oversee 
sectors of the market such as cattle dealers and drivers ‘among others’. Such that they 
can identify or become vigilant of suspected criminals”. 58 
Prior to the advent of the Nigeria Police Force in 1889 by the British Colonial 
administration, there were various groups performing the role of policing the 
communities.  In the Southern part of Nigeria, communities had their own ways of 
detecting and preventing crimes. In some Igbo pre-colonial societies, the role of 
policing or protecting lives and properties  of  the  people  was  the  responsibility  of  
the  entire community even though it was facilitated by the  age  grade  and masquerade 
societies. Among the Okrika, Kalabari, Nembe and Akassa Ijo, there was the Sekiapu 
club also  known as Sekeni or Ekine enforced the payment of debts, investigated and 
generally acted  as  Police  in  each  village,  just  like  the Ekpe society  did  among the 
Efiks.59 While in the Northern part of the country, in areas like Bata and Nbula in Yola 
Province, the Mbamto, virgin   priestess   was   also instrumental for the detection of 
crimes.  Similarly, in Tiv land, the council of elders, the Mbavesen, performed useful 
                                                          
57 See Ibeanu and Momoh 2008 
58 Focus Group Participant Wudil Kano State, March 2015. 
59 Tamuno, T.N. “Crime and Security in Pre-colonial Nigeria: in Policing Nigeria: Past, 
Present and Future: (1993) 
26 
 
quasi-police functions.60 It was this model of community policing that colonial 
authorities supplanted with colonial police in 1889, to provide quasi-military assistance 
to the British colonial administration.61 
In several of these communities, women also played the primary role of socialisation, 
instilling discipline, morals and virtues in their children as part of the broader system 
of crime prevention and control in society. The display of deviant behaviour by children 
was often attributed to a lack of maternal care and supervision, a manifestation of the 
belief that women were ‘naturally’ capable of preventing and controlling crimes to 
enhance security in the society. For instance, the Ete group in Nsukka Division of 
Present day Enugu State in Nigeria “acted as police to collect women’s “Awha” (elders) 
to meetings and bring women who had committed offences before their council.62  
Politically, women also played prominent roles and held important positions among the 
majority of ethnic groups, particularly among the Hausas, the Yorubas and the Igbos. 
In the Hausa society, the dominant people culturally belonged to a civilization 
characterized by matrilineal succession in the ruling class, where women held high 
political offices. A particular case in point was queen Amina of Zaria who succeeded 
her father’s throne, led her first military charge a few months after assuming power 
fortified each of her military camps with an earthen wall.63   
Basically, pre-colonial Nigerian communities had persons who were entrusted with 
police duties. These ranged from men of valour, repute and those of military acclaim, 
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but certainly not strangers, rather, those who had local knowledge of the area. 
Messengers and bodyguards were also used, with emphasis on physical fitness and 
character.64Usually, these groups composed of individuals from the local community 
and often derived their credibility and unofficial authority from the community in which 
they serve. During this period, traditional institution particularly the traditional 
leadership remained a strong force to reckon with in securing communities. Traditional 
leaders in Nigeria have a complex and changing role in governance. The position of 
traditional rulers was divine and based on ritual leadership and political power seen 
with sacred trust between the people and their rulers.65 The people submitted 
themselves and were absolutely responsive to the authority of the rulers and in turn 
expected them to rule for the general good and welfare of the community. Functioning 
as both religious and administrative leaders, traditional rulers were also responsible for 
judiciary matters in their domains and led their people to war. In places like 
Yorubaland, Nupe kingdom, the king appointed Baloguns, in Edoland there was the 
Okakuo. These officers reported to their appointers, affairs concerning security in their 
areas of authority. By and large, structures existed that guaranteed security.66   
For the colonial administrators, the maintenance of law and order was to ensure that 
basic tasks were accomplished. The security of the colonial order and its agents was 
paramount. Apart from the heavily policed settler colonies, Africans were left to their 
own devices and local customs, under their traditional chiefs. In some cases, it was 
considered the responsibility of Africans to police their communities. Crime control 
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was dealt with by the Native Authority System, which enabled native rulers to exercise 
considerable political powers. These excessive powers allowed traditional rulers to use 
forced labour, impose arbitrary fines and practice oppressive rule. This liberal policy 
was extended to matters of security67. Thus, law and order, and the exercise of social 
control, were executed through communal initiatives.68 
The later termed indirect rule strengthened the power and influence of traditional rulers 
and created arbitrary powers as experimented with the establishment of ‘Warrant 
Chiefs’ to act like the Hausa Emirs or Yoruba Obas.69 As self-government drew near, 
traditional rulers were given a say in governmental matters. Undoubtedly, the 
introduction of the indirect rule system, first in Northern Nigeria and later in the South, 
gave traditional rulers the opportunity of active participation within the colonial 
government, through the Native Authority System. 70 The colonial conquest of some 
states in Northern Nigeria also led to the establishment of police courts and prisons as 
a means of coercion71.To curtail crime, the Yandoka, which was the pre-British system 
of policing, was made to join the British Police, such that: “the decrease in crime in the 
Province in 1933 was partly attributed to it.72 
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This suggests the Nigerian state never relied on the colonial administrative structure 
and agencies for security but rather, created parallel security agencies for intelligence, 
surveillance and monitoring of the colonial State73 and as societies develops, incidence 
of crime and insecurity take different shapes, requiring society to adjust, by 
accommodating new actors in the provision of security. These informal security sector 
also known as an informal policing structure or voluntary are referred to as vigilantes, 
neighbourhood watch, ethnic vigilante, religious vigilante, community guards or 
traditional police in Nigeria.74 Hitherto, available literature shows that since colonial 
times, neighbourhood watches and vigilantism have spread as a result of persistent 
capacity and inadequacy to keep the populace safe.75 
This history corroborates Alemika’s arguments that since colonial times, 
neighbourhood watches and vigilantes have become widespread as a result of persistent 
low police capacity in providing security to the populace. These types of vigilante are 
not rigid or exclusive; a group may combine the features of two or more types.76 
Vigilante groups of whatever forms offer a modicum of refuge to Nigerians who seek 
security in an increasingly unstable society. The popular logic for vigilantism was 
characterized by historical complexities of violence, injustice and depressing economic 
conditions.  
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Conversely, the development of private security arrangements in Nigeria has been 
classified into three main moments; the moment of resort to traditional self-help 
strategies to compensate inadequacies; mapping of non-State security structure in the 
growth of private security companies and the trajectory of private security arrangements 
that has led to the emergence of armed militias each arising out of gaps in public 
security decision-making structures in the face of increasing crime.77 The second trend 
in the emergence of non-State security structures in postcolonial Nigeria was the growth 
of private security companies.  
The rise particularly in the 1980s, was a reflection of the need to provide more 
professional security services to private and public establishments, as well, as 
individual homes.78 Alemika also asserts that the crime rate rising from the 1980s, 
particularly armed robbery; more vigilante groups arose in towns and cities to 
compensate for police inadequacies.79  However, the perception of police as alien, 
corrupt and occupying force by the citizens has not changed since the colonial period. 
Marenin claimed that, “the public avoids contact with the police to the point of not 
reporting crimes or accidents as it is widely believed that to be a police witness is almost 
as bad as being the criminal offender”. 80 
From 1995 onwards, the economic, social, communal and political challenges that 
Nigeria faced threw up a complex security dynamic which made non-State security 
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actors visible and relevant, thus eroding the State’s monopoly of security decision-
making and necessitating the need for non-State actors security.81 In the late 1990’s 
and early 2000’s, the security landscape further changed dramatically with the 
emergence of several insurgent and tribal militia, ethnic, communal and community 
groups like the Oodua People’s Congress, Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, Arewa Youth, 
Yan banga, Yankalare, Hunters and the Civilian Joint Task Force, amongst others 
across the country in response to some governance and security gaps in their 
communities.82 The operational structures of these voluntary policing groups vary; 
some groups have well documented structures, operational guidelines and 
administrative or financial procedures. State sponsored actors have structures at state, 
zonal, local government and community levels.  
The standard procedure for recruitment is by referral by existing members or vetting by 
community leaders and accordingly, their roles and functions of include providing 
security, early warning alerts, traffic control, gathering intelligence, settling dispute, 
conducting and combining community developments activities with security roles or 
enforcing religious rights. 83 
“A participant observed that virtually everyone in this community is kwato da gora 
(vigilante) but the recognized ones are the civilian JTF and members of the BOYES 
who are majorly volunteers”84.  
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The increasing involvement of non-State actors in security decision-making of Nigeria 
is sometimes in cooperation and sometimes in conflict with State structures.85 Other 
forms of hybridity witnessed between the formal and informal sectors, emerged 
between 1999 and 2001 after Nigeria’s return to civil rule. Vigilantism became one of 
OPC’s main activities at the time of rising criminality. The OPC as a cultural and self-
determination group remained a very vocal political actor in South West Nigeria 
because the police force was highly a distrusted institution, alternately for its 
passiveness, degree of corruption and its propensity to overact when it intervenes. Thus 
OPC became the police force that poor people can rely on and an alternative traditional 
dispute settler. Its successes lie in its ability to bridge gaps and delivery of public 
services in areas completely abandoned by formal institutions.86 Doubtfully,  the 
security services of the OPC has become less pronounced as other non-formal actors 
such as vigilantes and the confederating state government created Neighbourhood 
Watch Group to fill the non-state (informal) security vacuum created by the roll back 
of the OPC. 
The reintroduction of Sharia Law into by twelve states in Northern Nigeria also 
emerged to develop and strengthened judicial, administrative and policing apparatuses 
through the establishment of several bodies, primarily to serve or support the 
application of Sharia Law in those States.87 The bodies established include the various 
Sharia Commissions, Zakkah Commissions, Anti-Corruption Commissions, Sharia 
Implementation Advisory Commissions, Shura Councils, A Daidaita Sahu, Zauren 
Sulhu and Hisbah Commissions. The most embedded of these commissions is the 
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Hisbah Commission. The blueprints/whitepapers and other government policies that 
brought in Sharia Law incorporates the provision for the establishment of Islamic based 
regulatory agencies, be it by the name of Hisbah, market judge or Islamic market 
regulations.88 
Hisbah structures are in four levels, state, senatorial district, L.G.A and community. 
The state level comprises three divisions, the board, administration and command. The 
board advises the government on Islamic matters, the administration handles 
administrative activities of the hisbah commission and the command controls the 
enforcement of sharia law.89 Though NPF retains its constitutional role even if it fails 
to provide adequate security, it is complemented or supplemented by the state 
sponsored Islamic guards known as Hisbah and by self-help community protection 
groups such as trade association.90 Other group identified to have complemented the 
police even before Hisbah in Kano include Community Security Association, Bajira, 
Uwar Wudil, KAROTA amongst others.91  
Hisbah is an informal security group that has faith and state sponsored roots that was 
established to enforce a distinctive ‘Islamic government and tackles the problems of 
community security in a different way. Indeed, it is dedicated to the abolition of the 
business and consumption of beer and sex work and to the policing of a moral order 
based on Sharia’. Hisbah vigilantism differs markedly from those carried out by 
neighbourhoods. The identity of Hisbah vigilante was distinguished by Islamic religion 
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and combines security duties with religious services including patrolling schools and 
communities, gather information, monitor social activities and traffic control.92 The 
Hisbah organization from the study proves to have similarities formal security 
organization, but affirm to be subordinate to formal security actors, subjecting Hisbah 
to trainings, oversights, collaborations and operations between actors. 
Unlike crime control vigilantism, this form of vigilante was rooted less in government 
ineffectiveness 93 but pursues an Islamic agenda bargaining maybe necessary but 
compromise is not seen but as strength and the various actors tolerates or accommodates 
each other’s rationalities. According to Rosenbaum and Sederberg, ‘social group 
performing control vigilantism may also be employed when religious values are 
threatened by the spread of secularism, heresy, or competition with other faith’.94  This 
body is responsible for the commanding of good and prohibiting evil is best done by 
the Hisbah which has powers to arrest, seize, regulate, control, supervise and sometimes 
prosecute offenders in every Islamic environment that enjoys the leverage of applying 
Sharia Law. The Hisbah group is expected to perform some regulatory and security 
functions: 
“According to respondents in a FGD in Gwarzo, Hisbah group in general helps us curb 
the menace of drug abuse because the religion forbids it. Hisbah also deals with issues 
of reconciliation. For instance, criminals caught by the vigilante group are handed over 
to Hisbah, but if the offence is massive, hisbah refer the case to the formal police for 
necessary actions95 
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In the new democratic dispensation, the police at the beginning of the Sharia processes 
were not ready to enforce Sharia rules and laws.96 The Attorney General of the 
Federation also sent a memorandum to the Governors of the States informing them that 
Sharia Law is illegitimate97 This implies that the apparatus of the Federal Government 
is not expected to ‘lend its hand’ towards the implementation of Sharia Law. Thus, the 
state-sanctioned Hisbah became imperative, as the Nigerian police lacked the 
prerequisite training.98  
Hisbah has the largest profile of Kano’s policing groups, and is currently an important 
actor by virtue of its religious significance, access to state decision makers and the 
popularity as a provider of quick an affordable justice99 and was initially widely 
accepted by the people and reluctantly by the police. But this trend changed with the 
passing of a Law by the State House of Assembly, prohibiting the ferry of women on 
Achaba (motorcycles) in Kano State. The enforcement of the Traffic Amendment Law 
of 2004 by Hisbah drew resentment from many youths, whose livelihood, were 
threatened by the legislation.100  
The Federal Government was suspicious of the rapidly growing strength of Hisbah, 
especially since secessionist bids; ethno-religious bigotry and global terrorism were 
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reaching alarming proportions. Thus, the government began to view Hisbah as a parallel 
institution, performing the statutory functions of the police, including: arrest, 
interrogation and detention of suspects. The Hisbah structure was furthermore 
organised on the same model as the conventional police including intelligence, 
investigation and operation units.101 
In 2006, the former Inspector General of Police declared Hisbah an illegal organization 
and ordered the arrest of two of its top officials. Hisbah challenges the NPF’s secular 
understanding of policing and community security.102  The Kano State government 
challenged this move at the Supreme Court by instituting a case against the Federal 
government and invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under section 
232 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. The Supreme Court 
held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because there was no dispute involving 
the Federal Government and Kano State government. The court however observed that 
the responsibilities of the Hisbah Corps under the Hisbah Board Law of 2003 were 
identical to the responsibilities of the police under the Police Act of 1943.103   
Conversely, it is insightful to see the Hisbah not as the police or a security agency but 
an agency that assisted the police and other security agencies. This is because the 
Hisbah was involved in activities that transcended policing or security matters; it was 
involved in encouraging whatever was good and propagated it and also discouraged 
and eradicated whatever was contrary.104 Hisbah by virtue of its religious significance, 
                                                          
101 Rasheed Olaniyi Hisba and the Sharia Law Enforcement in Metropolitan Kano 
102 Tensions in Kano as Sharia agents, police flex muscles, Compass, 2 April 2009. 
http://www.compassnewspaper.com/NG/index. Retrieved June 15 2016 
103 R.O Olaniyi, Community Vigilantes in Metropolitan Kano 
104Barkindo Ibrahim, The Role of the Institution of Hisba In The Sharia Implementing 
States In Northern Nigeria. A Thesis Submitted To The Faculty Of Law, Ahmadu Bello 
University, Zaria unpublished 2011. 
37 
 
access to state decision makers and populate as a provider of quick and affordable 
justice 105 winning the hearts and minds of people and was involved in preaching, 
counselling, encouraging, assisting and cooperating. These issues were outside the 
purview of the Nigeria Police or any other governmental agency.  
Just like the introduction of Sharia Law gave rise to the emergence of Hisbah groups, 
the outbreak of criminality, insurgency have equally underpinned the proliferation of 
many vigilantes/civilian volunteers across the country, with some of them operating in 
the form of militia groups.  The on-going insurgency has further heightened the 
proliferation of vigilantes that participate in counter insurgency operations alongside 
State security actors. Kano has a mixed system that is defined in relation to NPF. It is 
not a fluid interpretation of additional and residual security in which forms state 
municipal, private and voluntary policing coalesces in a mixed economy.106 
The Civilian Joint Task Force informal groups originated from the willingness of some 
youths in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States to give useful information regarding the 
activities of Boko Haram Terrorists (henceforth referred to as BHTs). These youths 
emboldened many others who came out en-masse to voluntarily give information and 
identify the BHTs in their communities. Members of the public described these civilian 
volunteers as “Civilian Joint Task Forces” Civilian JTF.  The Civilian JTF and about a 
dozen other vigilante groups around the Northeast played a pivotal role in turning the 
tide against the BHTs, beginning mid-2014. They defended the communities from raids 
and detained hundreds of suspected terrorists before handing them over to the military 
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while some have also operated alongside the military in attacking Boko Haram camps 
and rescuing adopted women and girls. 
The youths resorted to mounting roadblocks and checkpoints for better identification 
and arrest of BHTs. Unfortunately, some of their activities degenerated to other forms 
of misconduct including extortion from commuters and human rights abuses. The 
informed need for better organization, administration and control to ensure effective 
control led to the emergence of the BOYES. The BOYES was thus formed out of the 
local civilian volunteers, trained and financed by the Borno State Government for the 
purpose of information gathering and other minor tasks including traffic control.107  
The current strength of the BOYES is about 1,800, while the local hunters and youth 
vigilantes who have not been trained are estimated to be about 5,000.  Findings from 
our field survey indicated the age bracket of the BOYES is from 18-40 years, while 
their academic qualifications range from no education at all, to Primary/Senior 
Secondary School Certificate (SSCE), to National Diploma (ND). They are paid a 
monthly salary of N15, 000:00 by the Borno State Government. Additionally, they are 
provided with uniforms and mobilized with patrol vehicles, while the rest survive on 
occasional ‘welfare’ from the State, and the Operation Commands in the field.108  
Abba Aji Kalli, asserts that there are 26,000 registered loose members of the Civilian 
JTF, organized from each ward and some major towns, as well as trained in the art of 
warfare.109 The “CJTF” is divided into 10 sectors under the Divisional Garrison, in line 
with the sectors of the military troops. Each group works in conjunction with, and under 
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the supervision of a Sector Command. Some plain cloth members also gather 
intelligence about insurgence to share with the military.110 However, there are some 
cases of human rights violations perpetrated by the members of “CJTF”. Investigations 
revealed that these misconducts were observed in the early stages of their operation 
when the youths were still nursing serious grudges against the dastardly acts meted out 
on their parents and family by BHTs and had not come under the control of the 
military.111  
Information reveals that the acts rights violations were rampant in the course of 
identifying the disguised BHTs among law-abiding citizens. It is however believed that 
if the volunteers are properly organized, trained and financially remunerated, their 
youthful exuberance in the area of violation of the human rights would be better 
managed.112 Notwithstanding, the administration and control of the “CJTF” is yet to be 
properly streamlined.  This is because the volunteers are partially administered by their 
respective State governments, but controlled by the military. Though, efforts were made 
by the Military and Department of State Security to capture their biometric data, the 
exercises were, however, inconclusive largely due to logistic constraints.113 
From the foregoing, it is evident that security provisioning in recent times is not only 
by State institutions like the armed forces or State police (formal actors), but 
complemented by a broader range of non-State actors, which may include voluntary 
groups, community-based associations, citizens’ forums, commercial or corporate 
entities, militias, and neighbourhood watches. In response to the growing security 
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lacuna, due to inadequate manpower, security and the law enforcement agencies sought 
the creation of effective partnerships with the community and other public and private 
sector outfits. The role of alternative security providers such as private security 
companies, militia groups and community vigilante groups has grown in response to 
the changing environmental threats in Nigeria.114   
For instance, both State and non-State actors have in most cases cooperated and 
complemented security provisioning in communities across the Northeast. Checkpoints 
are manned not only by soldiers but civilians, mostly armed with little more than 
machetes and swords. The informal actors are mainly driven by a determination to 
establish some semblance of security within their communities. They organize 
themselves into groups to patrol streets in search of Boko Haram members.   
“They are similar in their operation, which is in the area of providing the requisite, 
protection of life and property. The difference is in the uniform state actors wear and 
the weapon they are assigned to carry that the vigilantes don’t have. They patrol like 
the soldiers and police, they make arrest, they do recognizance that is intelligence 
gathering for the community and they give feedback to the formal security actors. In 
fact there is a symbiotic relationship between both actors”.115  
On the conduct of the informal security actors, a respondent in a focus group discussion 
states that during operations the military use heavy military equipment including fighter 
jets, while the civilian vigilantes or city neighbourhood watches are armed with just 
machetes, axes, bows and arrows, clubs, swords and daggers. In a hybrid environment 
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such as this, accountability encompasses the notions of transparency, democratic and 
civilian oversight and control of the informal security actors.116 Accountability, 
explains and justifies their use of power publicly, as such, transparency is an essential 
foundation for accountability. Although communities heavily rely on the informal 
actors for their immediate security needs, formal actors are credited for their 
professionalism and capacity to handle complex issues.  
In an interview, a respondent stated that the structure of informal actors is not open for 
public oversight, but allows for advice and criticism that assist them in regulating their 
conduct.117  The resultant hybrid environment of multiple security providers will have 
some impact on society. Some vigilante groups differ in remarkable ways in terms of 
how they relate to State agencies and other politico logical authorities, with their 
reactions oscillating between different form of resistance, disengagement, 
accommodation, containment and collaboration.118 
According to a recent report, the Nigerian Police trained vigilantes on intelligence 
gathering in the 36 states of the country. Equally, the Governor of Abia State announced 
a far-reaching measure towards curtailing ethnic clashes that occurred between the Igbo 
traders and Hausa community. He ordered the revival of the moribund State owned 
vigilante group; the Abia State Vigilante Services, to enhance community policing; and 
directed traditional rulers to put forward names of 10 able-bodied youths from their 
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communities in a bid to further not only revamp the outfit but as well consolidate its 
reach and spread in the South- eastern state.   
The Impacts of Hybridization on Security in Nigeria 
Hybridity for the purpose of our work describes a situation in which there is a merging 
or synthesis of forms to create a new form. The informal/private security sector has 
been credited with varying degrees of success, which may be attributed to either their 
pro-poor orientation or efficiency in responding to security threats. For the majority of 
people excluded from mainstream security provisioning, informal mechanisms have 
become parallel strategies for protection. Hence, security is increasingly becoming a 
public good managed by both the Nigerian State and private entities, albeit in a 
cooperative fashion.119 
According to Jenerali, the cooperation between the State and non-State actors is  proved 
useful in the provision of essential services, and that both actors attest that room exists 
for close and productive cooperation. The cooperation that exists between the informal 
and formal actors does not preclude some elements of mistrust that could arise from 
partisanship.120 In a BBC documentary titled “Welcome to Lagos”, disputes among 
urban slum dwellers are first subjected to internal resolution mechanisms within the 
ambit of a non-State framework, with little or no resort to the instrumentality of State, 
owing to the absence of State presence. In some communities, the use of traditional 
voodoo in fishing out criminals has become a potent instrument in addressing the 
challenges posed by insecurity. In others, vigilante groups go on the hunt against idle 
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people in the late hours of the night, arresting and even detaining them in cells for 
possible trial in the morning.121  
Indeed in Nigeria, vigilantism has been linked to the breakdown of law and order and 
partisan politics in many parts of the country. Hisbah once linked to partisan politics in 
its early days. It was primarily used by the governor as a political machine rather than 
the enforcement of the Sharia Law. In recent times however, Hisbah have embraced 
democracy by providing security during elections, preventing ballot boxess from 
hijacking, intimidation of voters, rigging and violence.122 For example, the Hisbah 
resolved cases involving matrimonial, land, pastoralist, business transactions and 
neighbourhood disputes. The settlements of disputes were carried out by Zaurukan 
Zulhu, a Community Reconciliation Council established in the 44 Local Government 
Areas. Also, Hisbah assisted persons with medical support and provided Islamic Adult 
Education, provided security services at government offices and ministries as well as 
provided control to reduce congestion in the metropolis while missing persons and 
children were reunited with families. 
It is arguable to suggest that informal system of communication and understanding 
exists between the NPF and Kano’s religious authorities where sensitive or potentially 
controversial issues are dealt with unofficial. The NPF enforces secular aspects of the 
law by virtue of its statutory backing, while the Hisbah handles religious matters on the 
basis of its religious authority. When stalemate exists concerning the categorization of 
issues, an ad hoc committee meets to resolve the issue before it becomes public 
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knowledge.123 High and low level coexistence are seen in the light of the NPF’s dealings 
with the Emirate council and the Kano command of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria, 
while contestation characterizes its relations with Hisbah.  This suggests that the 
discretion and political skill rather than strategy are more critical for effective police 
management in Kano’s competitive environment, and that co-existence association and 
contestation are more typical than cooperation. High and low level coexistence are seen 
in the light of the NPF’s dealings with the Emirate council and the Kano command of 
the Vigilante Group of Nigeria, while contestation characterizes its relations with 
Hisbah.  This suggests that the discretion and political skill rather than strategy are more 
critical for effective police management in Kano’s competitive environment, and that 
co-existence association and contestation are more typical than cooperation.124 
Similarly, the cooperation between the Civilian JTF and the military has assisted law 
enforcement agencies to provide security to troubled locations.125  This corroborates 
Albrecht’s findings that rather than seeing local actors as simply challenging the State’s 
claim on the monopoly of security provision, a strong degree of integration is 
imperative.126 This form of collaboration helped the JTF to significantly overturn deep-
seated mistrust, suspicion and fear, characterizing the relationship between the security 
operatives and the civilian populations. Typically, such collaboration involves 
information sharing, training, and operational responsibilities, the result of which has 
somewhat improved intelligence gathering, leading to the effective identification of sect 
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members and violent activities. Their contribution to providing a safe environment is 
well captured by an interviewed participant when he noted; 
…The BOYES are more relevant because they are within the environment in 
every community you will find their presence. The communities have trust for 
them they are immediate to respond in case of any problem compared to the 
police or the military in the Military Joint Task Force with limited presence in 
some streets. The non-State actors are the people who know the people and can 
identify the good, the bad and the ugly in their community; they are an integral 
part of the people. The soldiers may be smart with the security but they lack the 
knowledge of the environment the way the BOYES have. I will pitch my tent with 
them’’127 
Kwaja rightly states that in several states across Nigeria, groups and communities are 
increasingly relying on informal security providers in response to their own rising 
insecurity and declining confidence in formal State institutions, particularly the police. 
Subsequently confronted by the harsh realities of insecurity, groups and communities 
are moving beyond ethnic, religious, and regional nationalism towards a shared sense 
of under-class alienation from land, livelihood and largesse.128 There is also a strong 
preference for disputes within the communities and between the states, to be resolved 
informally, rather than through the formal law enforcement channels of the federal state 
that fails to provide the justice, mediation and reconciliation services that Islam 
advocates.129  
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The Public support for informal security structures is fundamentally because they are 
considered part and parcel of the community, shares similar sentiments and aspirations 
with the rest members of the community. Their commitment is also defined by their 
membership of the community and identification with its collective interests.  Though, 
members of the civilian JTF are volunteers, they now receive State stipend, this gives 
financial assistance especially to families of those killed in action while the JTF pays 
for treatment of injuries sustained in encounters with Boko Haram members but in spite 
of their commendable activities, the Federal Government needs to develop a coherent 
policy for dealing with vigilante groups.130 
 
Gender Mainstreaming in Hybridity of Security Provisioning 
Gender, refers to the role and relationships, personality, traits, attitudes, behaviours and 
values that society ascribe to men and women. Women, men, girls and boys have 
different security experiences and priorities. Gender and gender security is perceived 
differently by different people131 and also women or locals are not homogenous whole. 
In response to different security needs within the society, the integration into the 
discourse is a key to the effectiveness and accountability of security reform. Individual 
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security needs vary depending on factors such as sex, ethnicity, age, physical ability 
and sexual orientation.132  
Over the years, men have continued to be vastly over-represented in security (sector) 
institutions in Nigeria. The practice of gender discrimination has largely been attributed 
to culture and tradition that place different values on males and female rights from birth. 
These traditional norms, values and practices subordinate women and obstruct their 
progress in both private and public spheres. This perpetuates unequal power relations, 
with men having all power to legally influence decisions133, as well as, dominate in 
security institutions a conundrum that is to a large extent rooted in Nigeria’s colonial 
experience.  
Years after the establishment of the Nigeria Police Force in 1930134, no women police 
existed in Nigeria. The policing philosophy and tradition of the colonial State also 
assigned policing as predominantly a task for adult males up until 1955, when Nigerian 
Women’s Party (NWP) proposed changes in policing tradition and organisation to 
establish the ‘Women’s Police Branch’ (WPB).135 Between the early years 1940s and 
1955, women police in Nigeria went through the phases of integration, acceptance and 
development136.  The Nigerian experience at that time was quite different to the rest of 
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the world, in that the reform of policing tradition and organisation resulted in the design 
of an unusual style of social-work-oriented policing, geared specifically towards 
policing women and children. This new style of policing was radically different from 
traditional policing operations.137 
However, women’s involvement in social control has not remained static. In order to 
meet the needs of women and children (in trouble), women have supported formal 
agents of social control, by enlisting in the police and other security sector institutions 
(SSIs). Conspicuously, women were not deemed fit for the rigours of police work until 
the increase in criminal activities involving women suggested a profound need for 
women police in crime prevention and control. As a result, the campaign for the 
enlistment of women in the police started, dwelling on the need for women police to 
assist in the prevention of prostitution and the protection of its victims.138  
The pressure on the colonial administration, as well as the police authorities, regarding 
the need to enlist women in the police made the colonial government announce its 
decision to establish the ‘Women’s Police Branch’.139 The screening process relied 
heavily on physical ability rather than verbal communication skills or a background in 
problem solving since policing involves more communication skills and negotiating 
abilities.  Pioneer women police were trained in Western dressing and footwear, 
gymnastics, swimming, lifesaving, first aid, fire and ambulance drills, police duties, 
court procedure, law of evidence, criminal law, penal code and field training, with the 
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exception of arms drills. Firearms were considered unnecessary for the roles undertaken 
by women police, who were considered too weak to handle heavy weaponry.140 
The first task of the pioneer policewomen was to take care of female prisoners and 
juveniles and to obtain their statements. These policewomen were employed for 
investigative duties with the railway police and at the police headquarters in matters 
involving women and children. The distinction between social-work-oriented roles for 
policewomen as opposed to the traditional masculine roles of police officers, created 
gendered segregation in police work, but nevertheless initiated specialised 
responsibilities and compounded the social duties of women in the police force141.  
Currently, is an increase in the number of women in the NPF. The proportion of female 
police officers has increased substantially in the last two decades. In 1993; there were 
137,734 officers, 6,900 of whom were women (5.01%) (66). By 2007 the total number 
had risen to an estimated 320,000, with less than 2% of the station, command, division 
and area command headed by women. In 2009, the police service had staff strength of 
345,023 members, while estimates for 2010, put the size of the force at some 360,000 
police officers142. However, the increment in the number has not been reflected within 
higher ranks, whereby only 5.00% of senior offices are women compared to 8.03% in 
1993. Data provided in July 2010 by UNIFEM estimated 35,192 female junior officers 
(12.90%) and that 936 of the 18,745 senior officers were women (5.00%). The same 
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data indicated 97.41% of the female staff occupied lower ranks compared to 93.02% of 
their male colleagues.143  
Despite the promise of gender mainstreaming, gender sensitivity in SSR has often been 
reduced to recruiting and retaining women in the security sector144although modest 
achievement have recorded in terms of gradual increase in female recruitment into the 
NPF, the problem of gender discrimination still confronts the very few women within 
the force and in spite frameworks, agenda setting, national action plans advocacy and 
training, only a substantive progress is made on women’s participation in security 
structures, and processes. The study by Alemika and Agugua stated 57.6% of women 
were reported to have been discriminated against in the force, while 41.9% women were 
less discriminated against in matters of ethnicity. The most important area of 
discrimination against women in the force is with regards to posting because the terms 
of posting fail to recognize gender specific needs.145 
Nonetheless, the police force is one SSI in Nigeria that has established both specialized 
structures for service recipients and procedures for dealing with gender based violence 
and drafting of gender policy. It has also introduced a recruitment target for women and 
is reviewing its internal regulations in order to counter discriminatory provisions.146 
Gender relations and the status of police-women in Nigeria have either been grounded 
in laws and policies and/or patriarchal attitudes. Golafale argued that this reflects the 
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perception that female police officers are “weaklings,” who cannot succeed in more 
traditional or conventional policing roles, and by extension, linked to broader societal 
restrictions on women and girls’ access to education and continuing high rates of female 
illiteracy in the country. These observations highlighted the insufficiency of simple 
quotas in bringing about gender equality in policing, and the shortcomings of 
quantitative measures in evaluating gender-sensitive police reform.147 
Equally, the Nigerian armed forces have adopted procedures to respond to Gender 
Based Violence perpetrated by their staff and have provided separate infrastructure for 
male and female staff. However, the military has no gender policy, gender sensitive 
code of conduct or specialized gender structures or gender training. Women only 
account for 3% of military personnel and are banned from combats units. The high-
ranking female officers are mostly within the medical and catering units. So also, 
female participation in peacekeeping operation is limited.148 
Like their other counterparts in formal security, the information about women informal 
sector institutions inaccurate and largely inaccessible but considerably, the result 
observed from the field indicated 48% formation of non-state security outfits as against 
38%149, for most respondents there are there are no female memberships amongst non-
state security actors.  From this extraction, it can be deduced that, though there are 
considerations for women to become members of non-state actors, there representation 
is quite low in the formation of non-state security actors due to physiological factors 
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that might have played out in the cases of BAKASSI boys and the OPC in Abia and 
Lagos States respectively. 
According to a participant ‘Bakkassi boys’ as the name inclined, does not have much 
provision for women in the group and majorly male responsibilities when it comes to 
vigilantism and security provisioning in their communities even though the government 
incorporated the group, the representation of women is regarded as an insignificant 
number.150Likewise, the percentage of women representation in OPC is less frequent 
than because their roles are deeply rooted within a traditionally gendered experience 
even though female presence is instituted at all levels of the OPC’s administration 
through the creation of female leadership positions that complement those of men. 
Respondents corroborated that there are women within OPC’s outfits. Outside the scope 
of this study, the paper observes that, God motherism and financing of the group is 
played out by women market leaders in the case Bakassi Boys. Nolte affirms the 
existence of women’s wings is mostly associated with the limited representation of 
women’s interests.151 
Meagher affirms gender as rarely foregrounded in vigilantes’ understanding of 
community security, they frequently draw both on wider political debates and economic 
concerns.152 Though the report obtained from Lagos suggests low representation of 
women, participant acknowledges their support. The most visible structure of support 
for women within the OPC is its Women’s League which autonomously functioning 
within the overall structure of the organization and coordinates the activities of female 
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members. There are conflicting figures to women constituting the OPC structure, in 
Noltes reports between 10 and 20 per cent of the OPC’s overall membership of roughly 
3 million to which she regarded unrealistic than the assertion by Sesay et al. (2003) that 
the proportion of women in the OPC could be as high as 40 per cent.153 
In spite of the disparity in membership, female OPC members control an organizational 
wing within the OPC’s constitution, playing a full role in the life of the OPC and in its 
struggle for the emancipation of the oppressed. The presence is instituted at all levels 
of the OPC’s administration through the creation of female leadership positions to 
complement their men. At the highest executive level, the National Coordinating 
Council includes the secretary-general, the OPC state coordinators.154 A participant 
acknowledged that, though OPC has enabled and accepted women’s active 
participation in physical confrontations and vigilante activities in some communities, it 
has excluded women from such roles in others from most vigilante activities and 
conflicts in several of the communities. The main reason for this appears to be that in 
those communities vigilante activities were originally linked to the male-only Orò 
association, with which the OPC has some affinity.155  
Differing from Bakkassi and OPC, women representation in non-state security actors 
exist Borno and Kano states. The emergence of the CJTF and subsequent collaboration 
with the State security agencies to tackle insurgency in the affected states led to the 
adoption of new tactics by the insurgents. There are incidents where men were  
disguised as women in order to evade arrests and to carry out attacks. O’Rourke affirms 
that, feigning pregnancy may also decrease the likelihood of being subjected to a 
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thorough physical search.156 Evidently, Boko Haram women have graduated from being 
helpers who cook and clean to becoming suicide bombers. This new trend by Boko 
haram is becoming an effective strategy that draws attention from the general public 
and relevant support from their sympathizers.  
The use of female suicide bombers as fighters in the insurgency campaign as opined by 
some analysts is to cash in on the women bomber strategy, while others believe it is a 
sign of desperation, or perhaps the group running low on male fighters. Edukugho posits 
that terrorists’ organizations use women as weapons because the method provides 
tactical advantage: stealthier attack, element of surprise, hesitancy to search women, 
female stereotype (e.g. non-violent), increased number of combatants, increased 
publicity, psychological effect and human precision bomb.157 The Nigerian military has 
reportedly raised an alarm over new tactics being employed by the Boko Haram sect. 
The insurgents have relied on the knowledge that Nigerian troops have a responsibility 
to observe strict rules of engagement, hence recruiting children to fight and also women 
as human shields in a quest to weaken military operations. This recent phenomenon of 
using female as suicide attackers in the country represents a devastating situation on the 
counter insurgency operations. Ewi quotes that: ‘When you have female suicide 
bombers, the security challenge becomes bigger; it means you need female officers at 
every check-point to search women”.158 Available literature might not have reported 
the presence of female membership in the roles and ranks of CJTF due to general 
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patriarchal perception and representation of women as weaklings or being compared to 
female representation of most existing vigilantes. However, according to some 
interviewees, there is the perception of gender sensitivity in the structure of the BOYES 
(CJTF). Women have been deployed at check points, markets, motor parks and public 
places to search women and are majorly used as informants but membership does not 
cover women in tactical operations; they are strictly used for administrative purposes.159 
A female member of the CJTF during an interview affirms that women have also taken 
centre stage in the fight against terror in Borno State; she claimed to have joined the 
CJTF after the insurgents attacked and killed her family members. She started working 
as a community informant passing out intelligence about suspected members of the 
group to the military. Under the precepts of Islam, men are not allowed to enter the 
home of married women they are not related; in such situations she makes the arrest. 
The interviewee admits the work is hard and vulnerable for women.160 In a follow up 
interview, respondents in Maiduguri indicated that 250 members of the Civilian JTF 
just concluded military training and were fully inducted into the other ranks of the 
Nigerian Army. The recruitment process engaged qualified young individuals from the 
27 local governments of the State who were formerly members of the Civilian JTF. 
Unfortunately, only a female soldier was part of the newly recruited soldiers.161  
There is a prevailing narrative of women not able to explore their potential and 
possibilities roles in society, because they tend to be confined to the private sphere in 
this part of the country. As with the Civilian JTF, women have equally played a part in 
security efforts of the Hisbah. Since the establishment of Hisbah in Kano, there is an 
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open consideration of women in its formation of the group. For most respondents, the 
involvement of women in Hisbah is an integral aspect of dealing with the cases of 
women in every community in Kano state majorly playing the role of information 
gatherings and food joints. 162 In respect to Hisbah’s command and decision making 
structures, female commanders are in every local government to represent women, at 
least two in every community this. Usually, female members are used as informants in 
women gatherings and sometimes they organize and invite women for lectures. More 
so, issues regarding women are treated by women commanders. Equally, women are 
not engaged in operations, patrols and raiding but to some extend engaged in some 
administrative works. 
It is also observed that, the method of enlistment for most women into Hisbah is first 
being a Muslim with Knowledge of Islam with age limitation. The applicant needs an 
approval and consent of their fathers or spouses.  Report from Kano stipulates that 
between 1999 and 2003, there were 250 Hisbah Corps. In 2003, the Board was given 
the power to recruit 1000 corps out of which 700 corps (600 males and 100 females) 
was recruited at the State level.163 In 2005, the Hisbah operation was further 
strengthened with the massive recruitment of 9000 trained guards, 900 of whom were 
women and as part of the capacity building for Hisbah corps, a one-week induction 
course titled, ‘Towards Enhancing a More Enlightened Hisbah Command (women).164  
47% of respondents have also indicated that there are no specialized treatments for 
suspected female offenders and 36% indicated there were specialized treatments for 
suspected female offenders. This corroborates the U.S Department state report which 
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posits that authorities sometimes hold female and male prisoners together especially in 
rural areas. More so, prisons had no facilities for pregnant women or nursing mothers. 
Infants born by inmates in detention centres were usually remanded with mothers until 
they are weaned.165 In police detention, women were vulnerable to sexual abuse and 
other forms of violence, which may be used to force confessions to offences they did 
not commit. Apart from women held in police detention, another vulnerable group of 
imprisoned women were female combatants held as prisoners of war. According to 
Human Rights Report, security forces committed rape and other form of sexual violence 
against women and girls. Domestic and international human rights groups also reported 
the existence of unofficial military prisons in Maiduguri.166  
Reports from the field indicate that a large number of respondents do not agree that the 
decision making of the informal actors was without regard for the rule of law. For 
instance varying Sharia (Islamic Laws) penal codes delivered sentences in some Sharia 
States, for offences like prostitution. Some Sharia court judges allowed evidentiary 
requirements to prove adultery or fornication for female offenders. Some courts 
convicted men only if they confessed or there were eyewitness’ testimonies regarding 
the crime.   
CONCLUSION 
This paper addressed the concept of hybridization, formality and informality by 
offering diverse definitions and actors influencing security provisioning and the 
adoption of hybridization as multiplicity of situation of diverse animating logics, forms 
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of political authority co-existing, collaborating, or competing to construct security 
arrangement. Hybridity here does not denote the mere grafting together of separate 
actors and institutions to make new entities. A comparative of these kinds’ hybrid 
organization co-existing, overlapping and interwoven by formal and informal processes 
is discussed from security structures with common classification, sharing security 
spaces in Nigeria suggesting Bakassi Boys, Civilian JTF, Hisbah and Oodua People’s 
Congress.  
In this paper, security actors were discussed through rethinking informal vs formal. It 
demises the notion of codification and processes driven in the formal system or informal 
institutions lacking systems and processes but hybridity is centred on assisting, enabling 
actors and structures in effective, legitimate security and justice services to 
communities. The evolution of these actors is suggested in stages of progression, 
populist, consolidation, abuse and demise. Nigeria has gone through different periods 
and experienced different processes of composition, structures and ultimately practice. 
The paper acknowledges the attachment to informal security structures are part and 
parcel of the community sharing similar sentiments and aspirations with the rest 
members of the community and their commitment is defined by membership of the 
community and identification with its collective interests. 
Hybridization occurred levels and directions adopted and institutionalized in a modern 
or mixed way. The paper supports views on response to some governance and security 
gaps, incapacity of state security for the emergence and proliferation of informal actors; 
it also suggests the growing incidence of crime and insecurity take different shapes, had 
required society to adjust, by accommodating new actors in the provision of security to 
form a hybrid nature. The operational structures of these voluntary policing groups 
vary; some groups have well documented structures, operational guidelines and 
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administrative or financial procedures while the state sponsored actors have structures 
at state, zonal, local government and community levels. 
More recently, the paper observes that the services of actors like OPC and Bakassi Boys 
have become less pronounced as other non-formal actors such as vigilantes and the 
confederating state government created Neighbourhood Watch Group to fill the non-
state (informal) security vacuum created by the roll back for these groups. Hisbah an 
informal security group with has faith and state sponsored roots, established to enforce 
a distinctive ‘Islamic government and tackles the problems of community security in a 
different way combining security duties with religious services including patrolling 
schools and communities, gather information, monitor social activities and traffic 
control. Having had confrontations with formal over legality and legitimacy, the group 
and formal group tolerates and accommodates each other’s rationalities and equally 
playing the complementary roles. Other recognised group identified to play a 
complementary role is the child of necessity, the CJTF. It emerged as a voluntary 
organization in communities of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states playing the pivotal 
role of turning the tide against the Boko Haram terrorists. To ensure to ensure effective 
control and excesses of the group, the state coarse, trained and financed the group as 
state sponsored organization the Borno Youth Empowerment Scheme (BOYES) for the 
purpose of information gathering and other minor tasks including traffic control and 
similarly operating alongside formal actors in sector structures.  
The merging synthesis of hybridization credited with varying degrees of success, 
attributed to pro-poor orientation or efficiency in responding to security threats to 
become parallel strategies for the protection majorly people excluded from mainstream 
security provisioning. The collaboration between actors helped to significantly overturn 
deep-seated mistrust, suspicion and fear, characterizing the relationship between the 
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security operatives and the civilian populations.   Collaboration involves information 
sharing, training, and operational responsibilities, the result of which has somewhat 
improved intelligence gathering, leading to the effective identification of sect members 
and violent activities. 
 In Nigeria, gender in a wider hybrid security sector is treated as a niche issue, and in 
some cases peripheral, rather than seen as an integral part of the broader security sector 
agenda.  The paper portrays high consideration of women involvement but only a few 
enrol as informal security, for those engaged for services in are limited to administrative 
role reducing, women’s participation in the political sphere on the basis of gender 
equality Women in hybrid or informal security provisioning play complementary roles 
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